

MEMORANDUM

*Retained for discussion*  
*Handwritten notes*  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION 7887

~~SECRET~~ (GDS)

November 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

DR. KISSINGER

FROM:

HAROLD H. SAUNDERS  
JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE

SUBJECT:

Pakistan's Apparent Recognition of Hanoi

You should be aware of reports this morning that indicate that President Bhutto has approved the following steps:

--According to the Korean Consul in Islamabad, Pakistan intends to announce diplomatic recognition of North Korea on November 9 and at the same time intends to announce recognition of North Vietnam and of the Sihanouk government in Cambodia. Our Charge has been called in to see the acting Foreign Secretary today, despite the fact that today is a high Islamic religious holiday.

--Pakistani withdrawal from SEATO was announced this morning.

--We also have a report that the decision on SEATO was made at a cabinet meeting where President Bhutto was reportedly "extremely angry" at the US response to his PL-480 request. You will recall that he had asked for 400,000 tons of wheat over and above 600,000 tons for which agreements have already been signed. Following a careful review of our availabilities in the wake of the Soviet purchases, we promised 250,000 tons for the time being with another look at the situation in March.

As you recall, we have in past conversations with the Pakistanis urged them to hold off the recognition of Hanoi. In response to those approaches, Bhutto graciously said that he did not want to complicate the President's life before his election and would "defer action" until after the election not

~~SECRET~~ (GDS)

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PA/HO, Department of State  
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~~SECRET~~ (GDS)

- 2 -

only on establishing diplomatic relations with North Vietnam but also on recognizing the Sihanouk government and North Korea. The Pakistani step does not take into account the delicate stage of the Vietnam negotiations. Also, the recognition of the Sihanouk government works at cross purposes with our support for the Lon Nol government.

The only operational question today is whether we should put on the record our disappointment that these steps have been taken at this delicate stage in Vietnam negotiations. We have made substantial efforts to help Bhutto as far as possible, and we might have expected him to take into account our timing problems. We can expect him in the near future to present a sizable shopping list for military equipment, but we cannot deal with that issue now. The only point that need be addressed now is whether or not we want him to understand that he has taken a step which is not consistent with US interests.

Recommendation: That you call Ambassador Sultan Khan and express your personal disappointment and have State put our Charge in Islamabad in a position to do the same.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

*Kennedy To call in Amb Khan  
1/11/72 telcom with RHH 11/4/72*

Have State do it \_\_\_\_\_

Remain silent \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~ (GDS)